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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this conceptual paper is to provide readers with an opportunity to reassess 
their work and life in the face of an inevitable near term social collapse due to climate change.  
 
The approach of the paper is to analyse recent studies on climate change and its implications 
for our ecosystems, economies and societies, as provided by academic journals and 
publications direct from research institutes.  
 
That synthesis leads to a conclusion there will be a near term collapse in society with serious 
ramifications for the lives of readers. The paper reviews some of the reasons why collapse-
denial may exist, in particular, in the professions of sustainability research and practice, 
therefore leading to these arguments having been absent from these fields until now. 
 
The paper offers a new meta-framing of the implications for research, organisational practice, 
personal development and public policy, called the Deep Adaptation Agenda. Its key aspects 
of resilience, relinquishment and restorations are explained. This agenda does not seek to 
ďuild oŶ eǆistiŶg sĐholaƌship oŶ ͞Đliŵate adaptatioŶ͟ as it is pƌeŵised oŶ the ǀieǁ that soĐial 
collapse is now inevitable.  
 
The author believes this is one of the first papers in the sustainability management field to 
conclude that climate-induced societal collapse is now inevitable in the near term and 
therefore to invite scholars to explore the implications.  
 
Reader Support 
 
A list of readings, podcasts, videos and networks to support us in our emotional responses to 
the information contained in this paper is available at www.jembendell.com  
 
Introduction 
 
Can professionals in sustainability management, policy and research – myself included - 
continue to work with the assumption or hope that we can slow down climate change, or 
respond to it sufficiently to sustain our civilisation? As disturbing information on climate 
change passed across my screen, this was the question I could no longer ignore, and therefore 
decided to take a couple of months to analyse the latest climate science. As I began to 
conclude that we can no longer work with that assumption or hope, I asked a second 
question. Have professionals in the sustainability field discussed the possibility that it is too 
late to avert an environmental catastrophe and the implications for their work? A quick 
literature review revealed that my fellow professionals have not been publishing work that 
explores, or starts from, that perspective. That led to a third question, on why sustainability 
professionals are not exploring this fundamentally important issue to our whole field as well 
as our personal lives. To explore that, I drew on psychological analyses, conversations with 
colleagues, reviews of debates amongst environmentalists in social media and self-reflection 
on my own reticence. Concluding that there is a need to promote discussion about the 
implications of a social collapse triggered by an environmental catastrophe, I asked my fourth 
question on what are the ways that people are talking about collapse on social media. I 
identified a variety of conceptualisations and from that asked myself what could provide a 
map for people to navigate this extremely difficult issue. For that, I drew on a range of reading 
and experiences over my 25 years in the sustainability field to outline an agenda for what I 
haǀe teƌŵed ͞deep adaptatioŶ͟ to Đliŵate ĐhaŶge.  
 
The result of these five questions is an article that does not contribute to one specific set of 
literature or practice in the broad field of sustainability management and policy. Rather, it 
questions the basis for all the work in this field. It does not seek to add to the existing 
research, policy and practice on climate adaptation, as I found that to be framed by the view 
that we can manage the impacts of a changing climate on our physical, economic, social, 
political and psychological situations. Instead, this article may contribute to future work on 
sustainable management and policy as much by subtraction as by addition. By that I mean the 
implication is for you to take a time to step back, to consider "what if" the analysis in these 
pages is true, to allow yourself to grieve, and to overcome enough of the typical fears we all 
have, to find meaning in new ways of being and acting. That may be in the fields of academia 
or management - or could be in some other field that this realisation leads you to.  
 
First, I briefly explain the paucity of research that considers or starts from social collapse due 
to environmental catastrophe and give acknowledgement to the existing work in this field that 
many readers may consider relevant. Second, I summarise what I consider to be the most 
important climate science of the last few years and how it is leading more people to conclude 
that we face disruptive changes in the near-term. Third, I explain how that perspective is 
marginalised within the professional environmental sector – and so invite you to consider the 
value of leaving mainstream views behind. Fourth, I outline the ways that people on relevant 
social networks are framing our situation as one of facing collapse, catastrophe or extinction 
and how these views trigger different emotions and ideas.  Fifth, I outliŶe a ͞Deep AdaptatioŶ 
AgeŶda͟ to help guide disĐussioŶs oŶ ǁhat ǁe ŵight do oŶĐe ǁe ƌeĐogŶise Đliŵate ĐhaŶge is 
an unfolding tragedy. Finally, I make some suggestions for how this agenda could influence 
our future research and teaching in the sustainability field.  
 
As researchers and reflective practitioners, we have an opportunity and obligation to not just 
do what is expected by our employers and the norms of our profession, but also to reflect on 
the relevance of our work within wider society. I am aware that some people consider 
statements from academics that we now face inevitable near-term social collapse to be 
irresponsible due to the potential impact that may have on the motivation or mental health of 
people reading such statements. My research and engagement in dialogue on this topic, some 
of which I will outline in this paper, leads me to conclude the exact opposite. It is a responsible 
act to communicate this analysis now and invite people to support each other, myself 
included, in exploring the implications, including the psychological and spiritual implications.  
 
Locating this Study within Academia 
 
When discussing negative outlooks on climate change and its implications for human society, 
the response is often to seek insight through placing this information in context. That context 
is often assumed to be found in balancing it with other information. As the information on our 
climate predicament is so negative, the balance is often found in highlighting more positive 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ aďout pƌogƌess oŶ the sustaiŶaďilitǇ ageŶda. This pƌoĐess of seekiŶg to ͞ďalaŶĐe 
out͟ is a haďit of the iŶfoƌŵed aŶd ƌeasoŶiŶg ŵiŶd. Yet that does Ŷot ŵake it a logiĐal ŵeaŶs 
of deliberation if positive information being shared does not relate to the situation being 
described by the negative information. For instance, discussing progress in the health and 
safety policies of the White Star Line with the captain of the Titanic as it sank into the icy 
waters of the North Atlantic would not be a sensible use of time. Yet given that this balancing 
is often the way people respond to discussion of the scale and speed of our climate tragedy, 
let us first recognise the positive news from the broader sustainability agenda. 
 
Certainly, there has been some progress on environmental issues in past decades, from 
reducing pollution, to habitat preservation, to waste management. Much valiant effort has 
been made to reduce carbon emissions over the last twenty years, one part of climate action 
offiĐiallǇ teƌŵed ͞ŵitigatioŶ͟ (Aaron-Morrison et. al. 2017). There have been many steps 
forward on climate and carbon management – from awareness, to policies, to innovations 
(Flannery, 2015). Larger and quicker steps must be taken. That is helped by the agreement 
reached in December 2015 at the COP21 intergovernmental climate summit and now that 
there is significant Chinese engagement on the issue. To support the maintenance and scaling 
of these efforts is essential. In addition, increasing action is occurring on adaptation to climate 
change, such as flood defences, planning laws and irrigation systems (Singh et al, 2016). 
Whereas we can praise these efforts, their existence does not matter to an analysis of our 
overall predicament with climate change.  
 
Rather than building from existing theories on sustainable business, this paper is focusing on a 
phenomenon. That phenomenon is not climate change per se, but the state of climate change 
in 2018, which I will argue from a secondary review of research now indicates near term social 
collapse. The gap in the literature that this paper may begin to address is the lack of discussion 
within management studies and practice of the end of the idea that we can either solve or 
cope with climate change. In the Sustainability Accounting Management and Policy Journal 
(SAMPJ), which this paper was originally submitted to, there has been no discussion of this 
topic before, apart from my own co-authored paper (Bendell, et al, 2017). Three papers 
mention climate adaptation in passing, with just one focusing on it by considering how to 
improve irrigated agriculture (de Sousa Fragoso et al, 2018).1 
  
Organisation and Environment is a leading journal for discussion of the implications of climate 
for organisations and vice versa, where since the 1980s both philosophical and theoretical 
positions on environment are discussed as well as organisational or management implications. 
However, the journal has not published any research papers exploring theories and 
implications of social collapse due to environmental catastrophe.2 Three articles mention 
climate adaptation. Two of those have adaptation as a context, but explore other issues as 
their main focus, specifically social learning (Orsato, et al 2018) and network learning (Temby 
et al, 2016). Only one paper in that journal looks at climate adaptation as its main focus and 
                                                             
1 A full text search of the journal database shows that the following terms have never been included in articles in 
this journal: environmental collapse, economic collapse, social collapse, societal collapse, environmental 
catastrophe, human extinction. Catastrophe is mentioned in 3 papers, with two about Bangladesh factory fires 
and the other being Bendell et al (2017). 
2 A full text search of the journal database shows that the terms environmental collapse, social collapse and 
societal collapse have been mention in one different article each. Economic collapse has been mentioned in three 
articles. Human extinction is mentioned two articles. Environmental catastrophe is mentioned in twelve articles. 
A reading of these articles showed that they were not exploring collapse. 
the implications for organisation. While a helpful summary of how difficult the implications 
are for management, the paper does not explore the implications of a widespread social 
collapse (Clement and Rivera, 2016).  
 
Away from management studies, the field of climate adaptation is wide (Lesnikowski, et al 
2015). To illustrate, a search on Google Scholar ƌetuƌŶs oǀeƌ ϰϬϬϬϬ hits foƌ the teƌŵ ͞Đliŵate 
adaptation.͟ In answering the questions I set for myself in this paper, I will not be reviewing 
that eǆistiŶg field aŶd sĐholaƌship. OŶe ŵight ask ͞ǁhǇ Ŷot͟? The aŶsǁeƌ is that the field of 
climate adaptation is oriented around ways to maintain our current societies as they face 
manageable climactic perturbations (ibid). The concept of "deep adaptation" resonates with 
that agenda where we accept that we will need to change, but breaks with it by taking as its 
starting point the inevitability of societal collapse (as I will explain below).  
 
Our Non-Linear World 
 
This paper is not the venue for a detailed examination of all the latest climate science. 
However, I reviewed the scientific literature from the past few years and where there was still 
large uncertainty then sought the latest data from research institutes. In this section I 
summarise the findings to establish the premise that it is time we consider the implications of 
it being too late to avert a global environmental catastrophe in the lifetimes of people alive 
today.  
 
The simple evidence of global ambient temperature rise is undisputable. Seventeen of the 18 
warmest years in the 136-year record all have occurred since 2001, and global temperatures 
have increased by 0.9°C since 1880 (NASA/GISS, 2018). The most surprising warming is in the 
Arctic, where the 2016 land surface temperature was 2.0°C above the 1981-2010 average, 
breaking the previous records of 2007, 2011, and 2015 by 0.8°C, representing a 3.5°C increase 
since the record began in 1900 (Aaron-Morrison et al, 2017).  
 
This data is fairly easy to collate and not widely challenged, so swiftly finds its way into 
academic publications. However, to obtain a sense of the implications of this warming on 
environment and society, one needs real-time data on the current situation and the trends 
that it may infer. Climate change and its associated impacts have, as we will see, been 
significant in the last few years. Therefore, to appreciate the situation we need to look directly 
to the research institutes, researchers and their websites, for the most recent information. 
That means using, but not relying solely on, academic journal articles and the slowly produced 
reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). This international 
institution has done useful work but has a track record of significantly underestimating the 
pace of change, which has been more accurately predicted over past decades by eminent 
climate scientists. Therefore, in this review, I will draw upon a range of sources, with a focus 
on data since 2014. That is because, unfortunately, data collected since then is often 
consistent with non-linear changes to our environment. Non-linear changes are of central 
importance to understanding climate change, as they suggest both that impacts will be far 
more rapid and severe than predictions based on linear projections and that the changes no 
longer correlate with the rate of anthropogenic carbon emissions. In other words - ͚ƌuŶaǁaǇ 
Đliŵate ĐhaŶge.͛ 
 
The warming of the Arctic reached wider public awareness as it has begun destabilizing winds 
in the higher atmosphere, specifically the jet stream and the northern polar vortex, leading to 
extreme movements of warmer air north in to the Arctic and cold air to the south. At one 
point in early 2018, temperature recordings from the Arctic were 20 degrees Celsius above the 
average for that date (Watts, 2018). The warming Arctic has led to dramatic loss in sea ice, the 
average September extent of which has been decreasing at a rate of 13.2% per decade since 
1980, so that over two thirds of the ice cover has gone (NSIDC/NASA, 2018). This data is made 
more concerning by changes in sea ice volume, which is an indicator of resilience of the ice 
sheet to future warming and storms. It was at the lowest it has ever been in 2017, continuing 
a consistent downward trend (Kahn, 2017).  
 
GiǀeŶ a ƌeduĐtioŶ iŶ the ƌefleĐtioŶ of the “uŶ͛s ƌaǇs fƌoŵ the suƌfaĐe of ǁhite iĐe, aŶ iĐe-free 
Arctic is predicted to increase warming globally by a substantial degree. Writing in 2014, 
scientists calculated this change is already equivalent to 25% of the direct forcing of 
temperature increase from CO2 during the past 30 years (Pistone et al, 2014). That means we 
could cut CO2 emissions by 25% and it is already outweighed by the loss of the reflective 
power of Arctic sea ice. One of the most eminent climate scientists in the world, Peter 
Wadhams, believes an ice-free Arctic will occur one summer in the next few years and that it 
will likely increase by 50% the warming caused by the CO2 produced by human activity 
(Wadhams, 2016).3 In itself, that renders the calculations of the IPCC redundant, along with 
the targets and proposals of the UNFCCC.  
 
Between 2002 and 2016, Greenland shed approximately 280 gigatons of ice per year, and the 
islaŶd͛s lower-elevation and coastal areas experienced up to 13.1 feet (4 meters) of ice mass 
loss (expressed in equivalent-water-height) over a 14-year period (NASA, 2018). Along with 
other melting of land ice, and the thermal expansion of water, this has contributed to a global 
mean sea level rise of about 3.2 mm/year, representing a total increase of over 80 mm, since 
1993 (JPL/PO.DAAC, 2018). Stating a figure per year implies a linear increase, which is what 
has been assumed by IPCC and others in making their predictions. However, recent data 
shows that the upward trend is non-linear (Malmquist, 2018). That means sea level is rising 
due to non-linear increases in the melting of land-based ice.  
 
The observed phenomena, of actual temperatures and sea levels, are greater than what the 
climate models over the past decades were predicting for our current time. They are 
consistent with non-linear changes in our environment that then trigger uncontrollable 
impacts on human habitat and agriculture, with subsequent complex impacts on social, 
economic and political systems. I will return to the implications of these trends after listing 
some more of the impacts that are already being reported as occurring today.  
 
Already we see impacts on storm, drought and flood frequency and strength due to increased 
volatility from more energy in the atmosphere (Herring et al, 2018). We are witnessing 
negative impacts on agriculture. Climate change has reduced growth in crop yields by 1–2 
percent per decade over the past century (Wiebe et al, 2015). The UN Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO) reports that weather abnormalities related to climate change are costing 
billions of dollars a year, and growing exponentially. For now, the impact is calculated in 
                                                             
3 This was corrected from ͞double͟ in an earlier version.  
money, but the nutritional implications are key (FAO, 2018). We are also seeing impacts on 
ŵaƌiŶe eĐosǇsteŵs. Aďout half of the ǁoƌld͛s Đoƌal ƌeefs haǀe died iŶ the last ϯϬ Ǉeaƌs, due a 
mixture of reasons though higher water temperatures and acidification due to higher CO2 
concentrations in ocean water being key (Phys.org, 2018). In ten years prior to 2016 the 
Atlantic Ocean soaked up 50 percent more carbon dioxide than it did the previous decade, 
measurably speeding up the acidification of the ocean (Woosely et al, 2016). This study is 
indicative of oceans worldwide, and the consequent acidification degrades the base of the 
marine food web, thereby reducing the ability of fish populations to reproduce themselves 
across the globe (Britten et al, 2015). Meanwhile, warming oceans are already reducing the 
population size of some fish species (Aaron-Morrison et al, 2017). Compounding these threats 
to human nutrition, in some regions we are witnessing an exponential rise in the spread of 
mosquito and tick-borne viruses as temperatures become more conducive to them (ECJCR, 
2018). 
  
Looking Ahead 
 
The impacts I just summarised are already upon us and even without increasing their severity 
they will nevertheless increase their impacts on our ecosystems, soils, seas and our societies 
over time. It is difficult to predict future impacts. But it is more difficult not to predict them. 
Because the reported impacts today are at the very worst end of predictions being made in 
the early 1990s - back when I first studied climate change and model-based climate 
predictions as an undergraduate at Cambridge University. The models today suggest an 
increase in storm number and strength (Herring et al, 2018). They predict a decline of normal 
agriculture, including the compromising of mass production of grains in the northern 
hemisphere and intermittent disruption to rice production in the tropics. That includes 
predicted declines in the yields of rice, wheat, and corn in China by 36.25%, 18.26%, and 
45.10%, respectively, by the end of this century (Zhang et al, 2016). Naresh Kumar et al. (2014) 
project a 6–23 and 15–25% reduction in the wheat yield in India during the 2050s and 2080s, 
respectively, under the mainstream projected climate change scenarios. The loss of coral and 
the acidification of the seas is predicted to reduce fisheries productivity by over half (Rogers et 
al, 2017). The rates of sea level rise suggest they may be soon become exponential 
(Malmquist, 2018), which will pose significant problems for billions of people living in coastal 
zones (Neumann et al, 2015). Environmental scientists are now describing our current era as 
the sixth mass extinction event in the history of planet Earth, with this one caused by us. 
About half of all plants and animal species in the world's most biodiverse places are at risk of 
extinction due to climate change (WWF, 2018). The World Bank reported in 2018 that 
countries needed to prepare for over 100 million internally displaced people due to the effects 
of climate change (Rigaud et al, 2018), in addition to millions of international refugees.  
 
Despite you, me, and most people we know in this field, already hearing data on this global 
situation, it is useful to recap simply to invite a sober acceptance of our current predicament. 
It has led some commentators to describe our time as a new geological era shaped by humans 
- the Anthropocene (Hamilton, et al, 2015). It has led others to conclude that we should be 
exploring how to live in an unstable post-Sustainability situation (Benson and Craig, 2014; 
Foster, 2015). This context is worth being reminded of, as it provides the basis upon which to 
assess the significance, or otherwise, of all the praiseworthy efforts that have been underway 
and reported in some detail in this and other journals over the past decade. I will now offer an 
attempt at a summary of that broader context insofar as it might frame our future work on 
sustainability.  
The politically permissible scientific consensus is that we need to stay beneath 2 degrees 
warming of global ambient temperatures, to avoid dangerous and uncontrollable levels of 
climate change, with impacts such as mass starvation, disease, flooding, storm destruction, 
forced migration and war. That figure was agreed by governments that were dealing with 
many domestic and international pressures from vested interests, particularly corporations. It 
is therefore not a figure that many scientists would advise, given that many ecosystems will be 
lost and many risks created if we approach 2 degrees global ambient warming (Wadhams, 
2018). The IPCC agreed in 2013 that if the world does not keep further anthropogenic 
emissions below a total of 800 billion tonnes of carbon we are not likely to keep average 
temperatures below 2 degrees of global averaged warming. That left about 270 billion tonnes 
of carbon to burn (Pidcock, 2013). Total global emissions remain at around 11 billion tonnes of 
carbon year (which is 37 billion tonnes of CO2). Those calculations appear worrying but give 
the impression we have at least a decade to change. It takes significant time to change 
economic systems and so if we are not already on the path to dramatic reductions it is unlikely 
we will keep within the carbon limit. With an increase of carbon emissions of 2% in 2017, the 
decoupling of economic activity from emissions is not yet making a net dent in global 
emissions (Canadell et al, 2017). So, we are not on the path to prevent going over 2 degrees 
warming through emissions reductions. In any case the IPCC estimate of a carbon budget was 
controversial with many scientists who estimated that existing CO2 in the atmosphere should 
already produce global ambient temperature rises over 5°C and so there is no carbon budget – 
it has already been overspent (Wasdell, 2015). 
 
That situation is why some experts have argued for more work on removing carbon from the 
atmosphere with machines. Unfortunately, the current technology needs to be scaled by a 
factor of 2 million times within 2 years, all powered by renewables, alongside massive 
emission cuts, to reduce the amount of heating already locked into the system (Wadhams, 
2018). Biological approaches to carbon capture appear far more promising (Hawken and 
Wilkinson, 2017). These include planting trees, restoring soils used in agriculture, and growing 
seagrass and kelp, amongst other approaches. They also offer wider beneficial environmental 
and social side effects. Studies on seagrass (Greiner et al, 2013) and seaweed (Flanery, 2015) 
indicate we could be taking millions of tonnes of carbon from the atmosphere immediately 
and continually if we had a massive effort to restore seagrass meadows and to farm seaweed. 
The net sequestration effect is still being assessed but in certain environments will be 
sigŶifiĐaŶt ;Hoǁaƌd et al, ϮϬϭϳͿ. ‘eseaƌĐh iŶto ͞ŵaŶageŵeŶt-iŶteŶsiǀe ƌotatioŶal gƌaziŶg͟ 
practices (MIRG), also known as holistic grazing, show how a healthy grassland can store 
carbon. A 2014 study measured annual per-hectare increases in soil carbon at 8 tons per year 
on farms converted to these practices (Machmuller et al, 2015). The world uses about 3.5 
billion hectares of land for pasture and fodder crops. Using the 8 tons figure above, converting 
a tenth of that land to MIRG practices would sequester a quarter of present emissions. In 
addition, no-till methods of horticulture can sequester as much as two tons of carbon per 
hectare per year, so could also make significant contributions. It is clear, therefore, that our 
assessment of carbon budgets must focus as much on these agricultural systems as we do on 
emissions reductions.  
 
Clearly a massive campaign and policy agenda to transform agriculture and restore 
ecosystems globally is needed right now. It will be a huge undertaking, undoing 60 years of 
developments in world agriculture. In addition, it means the conservation of our existing 
wetlands and forests must suddenly become successful, after decades of failure across lands 
outside of geographically limited nature reserves. Even if such will emerges immediately, the 
heating and instability already locked into the climate will cause damage to ecosystems, so it 
will be difficult for such approaches to curb the global atmospheric carbon level. The reality 
that we have progressed too far already to avert disruptions to ecosystems is highlighted by 
the finding that if CO2 removal from the atmosphere could work at scale, it would not prevent 
massive damage to marine life, which is locked in for many years due to acidification from the 
dissolving of CO2 in the oceans (Mathesius et al, 2015). 
 
Despite the limitations of what humans can do to work with nature to encourage its carbon 
sequestration processes, the plaŶet has ďeeŶ helpiŶg us out aŶǇǁaǇ. A gloďal ͞gƌeeŶiŶg͟ of 
the planet has significantly slowed the rise of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere since the start 
of the century. Plants have been growing faster and larger due to higher CO2 levels in the air 
and warming temperatures that reduce the CO2 emitted by plants via respiration. The effects 
led the proportion of annual carbon emissions remaining in the air to fall from about 50% to 
40% in the last decade. However, this process only offers a limited effect, as the absolute level 
of CO2 in the atmosphere is continuing to rise, breaking the milestone of 400 parts per million 
(ppm) in 2015. Given that changes in seasons, temperatures extremes, flood and drought are 
beginning to negatively affect ecosystems, the risk exists that this global greening effect may 
be reduced in time (Keenan et al, 2016) 
 
These potential reductions in atmospheric carbon from natural and assisted biological 
processes is a flickering ray of hope in our dark situation. However, the uncertainty about their 
impact needs to be contrasted with the uncertain yet significant impact of increasing methane 
ƌelease iŶ the atŵospheƌe. It is a gas that eŶaďles faƌ ŵoƌe tƌappiŶg of heat fƌoŵ the suŶ͛s 
rays than CO2 but was ignored in most of the climate models over the past decades. The 
authors of the 2016 Global Methane Budget report found that in the early years of this 
century, concentrations of methane rose by only about 0.5ppb each year, compared with 
10ppb in 2014 and 2015. Various sources were identified, from fossil fuels, to agriculture to 
melting permafrost (Saunois et al, 2016).  
 
Given the contentiousness of this topic in the scientific community, it may even be 
contentious for me to say that there is no scientific consensus on the sources of current 
methane emissions or the potential risk and timing of significant methane releases from either 
surface and subsea permafrost. A recent attempt at consensus on methane risk from melting 
surface permafrost concluded methane release would happen over centuries or millennia, not 
this decade (Schuur et al. 2015). Yet within three years that consensus was broken by one of 
the most detailed experiments which found that if the melting permafrost remains 
waterlogged, which is likely, then it produces significant amounts of methane within just a few 
years (Knoblauch et al, 2018). The debate is now likely to be about whether other 
microorganisms might thrive in that environment to eat up the methane – and whether or not 
in time to reduce the climate impact.  
 
The debate about methane release from clathrate forms, or frozen methane hydrates, on the 
Arctic sea floor is even more contentious. In 2010 a group of scientists published a study that 
warned how the warming of the Arctic could lead to a speed and scale of methane release 
that would be catastrophic to life on earth through atmospheric heating of over 5 degrees 
within just a few years of such a release (Shakhova et al, 2010). The study triggered a fierce 
debate, much of which was ill considered, perhaps understandably given the shocking 
implications of this information (Ahmed, 2013). Since then, key questions at the heart of this 
scientific debate (about what would amount to the probable extinction of the human race) 
include the amount of time it will take for ocean warming to destabilise hydrates on the sea 
floor, and how much methane will be consumed by aerobic and anaerobic microbes before it 
reaches the surface and escapes to the atmosphere. In a global review of this contentious 
topic, scientists concluded that there is not the evidence to predict a sudden release of 
catastrophic levels of methane in the near-term (Ruppel and Kessler, 2017). However, a key 
reason for their conclusion was the lack of data showing actual increases in atmospheric 
methane at the surface of the Arctic, which is partly the result of a lack of sensors collecting 
such information. Most ground-level methane measuring systems are on land. Could that be 
why the unusual increases in atmospheric methane concentrations cannot be fully explained 
by existing data sets from around the world (Saunois et al, 2016)? One way of calculating how 
much methane is probably coming from our oceans is to compare data from ground level 
measurements, which are mostly but not entirely on land, with upper atmosphere 
measurements, which indicate an averaging out of total sources. Data published by scientists 
from the Arctic News (2018) website indicates that in March 2018 at mid altitudes, methane 
was around 1865 parts per billion (ppb), which represents a 1.8 percent increase of 35 ppb 
from the same time in 2017, while surface measurements of methane increased by about 15 
ppb in that time. Both figures are consistent with a non-linear increase - potentially 
exponential - in atmospheric levels since 2007. That is worrying data in itself, but the more 
significant matter is the difference between the increase measured at ground and mid 
altitudes. That is consistent with this added methane coming from our oceans, which could in 
turn be from methane hydrates.   
 
This closer look at the latest data on methane is worthwhile given the critical risks to which it 
relates. It suggests that the recent attempt at a consensus that it is highly unlikely we will see 
near-term massive release of methane from the Arctic Ocean is sadly inconclusive. In 2017 
scientists working on the Eastern Siberian sea shelf, reported that the permafrost layer has 
thinned enough to risk destabilising hydrates (The Arctic, 2017). That report of subsea 
permafrost destabilisation in the East Siberian Arctic sea shelf, the latest unprecedented 
temperatures in the Arctic, and the data in non-linear rises in high-atmosphere methane 
levels, combine to make it feel like we are about to play Russian Roulette with the entire 
human race, with already two bullets in the chamber. Nothing is certain. But it is sobering that 
humanity has arrived at a situation of our own making where we now debate the strength of 
analyses of our near-term extinction.  
 
Apocalypse Uncertain  
 
The truly shocking information on the trends in climate change and its impacts on ecology and 
society are leading some to call for us to experiment with geoengineering the climate, from 
fertilizing the oceans so they photosynthesize more CO2, to releasing chemicals in the upper 
atmospheƌe so the “uŶ͛s ƌaǇs aƌe ƌefleĐted. The uŶpƌediĐtaďilitǇ of geoeŶgiŶeeƌiŶg the Đliŵate 
through the latter method, in particular the dangers of disturbances to seasonal rains that 
billions of people rely on, make it unlikely to be used (Keller et al, 2014). The potential natural 
geoengineering from increased sulphur releases from volcanoes due to isostatic rebound as 
ǁeight oŶ the Eaƌth͛s Đƌust is ƌedistƌiďuted is Ŷot likelǇ to ŵake a sigŶifiĐaŶt ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ to 
earth temperatures for decades or centuries.  
 
It is a truism that we do not know what the future will be. But we can see trends. We do not 
know if the power of human ingenuity will help sufficiently to change the environmental 
trajectory we are on. Unfortunately, the recent years of innovation, investment and patenting 
indicate how human ingenuity has increasingly been channelled into consumerism and 
financial engineering. We might pray for time. But the evidence before us suggests that we are 
set for disruptive and uncontrollable levels of climate change, bringing starvation, destruction, 
migration, disease and war. 
 
We do not know for certain how disruptive the impacts of climate change will be or where will 
be most affected, especially as economic and social systems will respond in complex ways. But 
the evidence is mounting that the impacts will be catastrophic to our livelihoods and the 
soĐieties that ǁe liǀe ǁithiŶ. Ouƌ Ŷoƌŵs of ďehaǀiouƌ, that ǁe Đall ouƌ ͞ĐiǀilisatioŶ,͟ ŵaǇ also 
degrade. When we contemplate this possibility, it can seem abstract. The words I ended the 
previous paragraph with may seem, subconsciously at least, to be describing a situation to feel 
sorry about as we witness scenes on TV or online. But when I say starvation, destruction, 
migration, disease and war, I mean in your oǁŶ life. With the poǁeƌ doǁŶ, sooŶ Ǉou ǁouldŶ͛t 
have water coming out of your tap. You will depend on your neighbours for food and some 
ǁaƌŵth. You ǁill ďeĐoŵe ŵalŶouƌished. You ǁoŶ͛t kŶoǁ ǁhetheƌ to staǇ oƌ go. You ǁill feaƌ 
being violently killed before starving to death.  
 
These descriptions may seem overly dramatic. Some readers might consider them an 
unacademic form of writing. Which would be an interesting comment on why we even write 
at all. I chose the words above as an attempt to cut through the sense that this topic is purely 
theoretical. As we are considering here a situation where the publishers of this journal would 
Ŷo loŶgeƌ eǆist, the eleĐtƌiĐitǇ to ƌead its outputs ǁoŶ͛t eǆist, aŶd a pƌofessioŶ to eduĐate 
ǁoŶ͛t exist, I think it time we break some of the conventions of this format. However, some of 
us may take pride in upholding the norms of the current society, even amidst collapse. Even 
though some of us might believe in the importance of maintaining norms of behaviour, as 
indicators of shared values, others will consider that the probability of collapse means that 
effort at reforming our current system is no longer the pragmatic choice. My conclusion to this 
situation has been that we need to expand our work oŶ ͞sustaiŶaďilitǇ͟ to ĐoŶsideƌ hoǁ 
communities, countries and humanity can adapt to the coming troubles. I have dubbed this 
the ͞Deep AdaptatioŶ AgeŶda,͟ to ĐoŶtƌast it ǁith the liŵited sĐope of ĐuƌƌeŶt Đliŵate 
adaptation activities. My experience is that a lot of people are resistant to the conclusions I 
have just shared. So before explaining the implications, let us consider some of the emotional 
and psychological responses to the information I have just summarised.  
 
Systems of Denial 
 
It would not be unusual to feel a bit affronted, disturbed, or saddened by the information and 
aƌguŵeŶts I haǀe just shaƌed. IŶ the past feǁ Ǉeaƌs, ŵaŶǇ people haǀe said to ŵe that ͞it ĐaŶ͛t 
be too late to stop climate change, because if it was, how would we find the energy to keep on 
stƌiǀiŶg foƌ ĐhaŶge?͟ With suĐh ǀieǁs, a possiďle ƌealitǇ is deŶied ďeĐause people ǁaŶt to 
ĐoŶtiŶue theiƌ stƌiǀiŶg. What does that tell us? The ͞stƌiǀiŶg͟ is ďased iŶ a ƌatioŶale of 
maintaining self-identities related to espoused values. It is understandable why that happens. 
If one has always thought of oneself as having self-worth through promoting the public good, 
then information that initially appears to take away that self-image is difficult to assimilate.  
 
That process of strategic denial to maintain striving and identity is easily seen in online 
debates about the latest climate science. One particular case is illustrative. In 2017 the New 
York Magazine published an article that drew together the latest data and analysis of what the 
implications of rapid climatic warming would be on ecosystems and humanity. Unlike the 
many dry academic articles on these subjects, this popular article sought to describe these 
processes in visceral ways (Wallace-Wells, 2017). The reaction of some environmentalists to 
this article did not focus on the accuracy of the descriptions or what might be done to reduce 
some of the worst effects that were identified in the article. Instead, they focused on whether 
such ideas should be communicated to the general public. Climate scientist Michael Mann 
ǁaƌŶed agaiŶst pƌeseŶtiŶg ͞the pƌoďleŵ as uŶsolǀaďle, aŶd feed[iŶg] a seŶse of dooŵ, 
iŶeǀitaďilitǇ aŶd hopelessŶess͟ ;iŶ BeĐkeƌ, ϮϬϭϳͿ. EŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal jouƌŶalist Aleǆ “teffeŶ ;ϮϬϭϳͿ 
tweeted that "Dropping the dire truth... on unsupported readers does not produce action, but 
fear." In a blog post, Daniel Aldana Cohen (2017) an assistant sociology professor working on 
Đliŵate politiĐs, Đalled the pieĐe ͞Đliŵate disasteƌ poƌŶ.͟ Theiƌ ƌeaĐtioŶs ƌefleĐt ǁhat soŵe 
people have said to me in professional environmental circles. The argument made is that to 
discuss the likelihood and nature of social collapse due to climate change is irresponsible 
because it might trigger hopelessness amongst the general public. I always thought it odd to 
restrict our own exploration of reality and censor our own sensemaking due to our ideas 
about how our conclusions might come across to others. Given that this attempt at censoring 
was so widely shared in the environmental field in 2017, it deserves some closer attention.  
 
I see four particular insights about what is happening when people argue we should not 
communicate to the public the likelihood and nature of the catastrophe we face. First, it is not 
untypical for people to respond to data in terms of what perspectives we wish for ourselves 
and others to have, rather than what the data may suggest is happening. That reflects an 
approach to reality and society that may be tolerable in times of plenty but counterproductive 
when facing major risks. Second, that we can overlook how the question of how bad news and 
extreme scenarios impacts on human psychology is a matter for informed discussion that can 
draw upon psychology and communications theories. Indeed, there are journals dedicated to 
environmental psychology. There is some evidence from social psychology to suggest that by 
focusing on impacts now, it makes climate change more proximate, which increases support 
for mitigation (McDonald et al, 2015). That is not conclusive, and this field is one for further 
exploration. That serious scholars or activists would make a claim about impacts of 
communication without specific theory or evidence suggests that they are not actually 
motivated to know the effect on the public but are attracted to a certain argument that 
explains their view.  
 
A third insight from the debates about whether to publish information on the probable 
collapse of our societies is that sometimes people can express a paternalistic relationship 
between themselves as environmental experts and other people whom they categorise as 
͞the puďliĐ͟. That is ƌelated to the ŶoŶ-populist anti-politics technocratic attitude that has 
pervaded contemporary environmentalism. It is a perspective that frames the challenges as 
one of encouraging people to try harder to be nicer and better rather than coming together in 
solidarity to either undermine or overthrow a system that demands we participate in 
environmental degradation.  
 
A fouƌth iŶsight is that ͞hopelessŶess͟ aŶd its ƌelated eŵotioŶs of disŵaǇ aŶd despair are 
understandably feared but wrongly assumed to be entirely negative and to be avoided 
ǁhateǀeƌ the situatioŶ. Aleǆ “teffeŶ ǁaƌŶed that ͞Despaiƌ is Ŷeǀeƌ helpful͟ ;ϮϬϭϳͿ. Hoǁeǀeƌ, 
the range of ancient wisdom traditions see a significant place for hopelessness and despair. 
CoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ ƌefleĐtioŶs oŶ people͛s eŵotioŶal aŶd eǀeŶ spiƌitual gƌoǁth as a ƌesult of theiƌ 
hopelessness and despair align with these ancient ideas. The loss of a capability, a loved one, a 
way of life, or receipt of a terminal diagnosis have all been reported, or personally 
experienced, as a trigger for a new way of perceiving self and world, with hopelessness and 
despaiƌ ďeiŶg a ŶeĐessaƌǇ step iŶ the pƌoĐess ;Matousek, ϮϬϬϴͿ. IŶ suĐh ĐoŶteǆts ͞hope͟ is Ŷot 
a good thing to maintain, as it depends on what one is hoping for. When the debate raged 
about the value of the New York Magazine article, some commentators picked up on this 
theŵe. ͞IŶ aďaŶdoŶiŶg hope that oŶe ǁaǇ of life ǁill ĐoŶtiŶue, ǁe opeŶ up a spaĐe foƌ 
alteƌŶatiǀe hopes,͟ wrote Tommy Lynch (2017).  
 
This question of valid and useful hope is something that we must explore much further. 
Leadership theorist Jonathan Gosling has raised the question of whether we need a more 
͞ƌadiĐal hope͟ iŶ the ĐoŶteǆt of Đliŵate ĐhaŶge aŶd a gƌoǁiŶg seŶse of ͞thiŶgs falliŶg apaƌt͟ 
(Gosling, 2016). He invites us to explore what we could learn from other cultures that have 
faced catastrophe. Examining the way Native American Indians coped with being moved on to 
reservations, Lear (2008) looked at ǁhat he Đalls the ͞ďliŶd spot͟ of aŶǇ Đultuƌe: the iŶaďilitǇ 
to conceive of its own destruction and possible extinction. He explored the role of forms of 
hope that iŶǀolǀed Ŷeitheƌ deŶial oƌ ďliŶd optiŵisŵ. ͞What ŵakes this hope ƌadiĐal, is that it 
is directed toward a future goodness that transcends the current ability to understand what it 
is͟ ;iďidͿ. He eǆplaiŶs hoǁ soŵe of the Natiǀe AŵeƌiĐaŶ Đhiefs had a foƌŵ of ͞iŵagiŶatiǀe 
eǆĐelleŶĐe͟ ďǇ tƌǇiŶg to iŵagiŶe ǁhat ethiĐal ǀalues ǁould ďe Ŷeeded iŶ their new lifestyle on 
the reservation. He suggests that besides the standard alternatives of freedom or death (in 
seƌǀiĐe of oŶe͛s ĐultuƌeͿ theƌe is aŶotheƌ ǁaǇ, less gƌaŶd Ǉet deŵaŶdiŶg just as ŵuĐh Đouƌage: 
the ǁaǇ of ͞Đƌeatiǀe adaptatioŶ.͟ This foƌŵ of Đƌeatively constructed hope may be relevant to 
our Western civilisation as we confront disruptive climate change (Gosling and Case, 2013). 
 
Such deliberations are few and far between in either the fields of environmental studies or 
management studies. It is to help break this semi-censorship of our own community of inquiry 
on sustainability that motivated me to write this article. Some scholarship has looked at the 
process of denial more closely. Drawing on sociologist Stanley Cohen, Foster (2015) identifies 
two subtle forms of denial – interpretative and implicative. If we accept certain facts but 
iŶteƌpƌet theŵ iŶ a ǁaǇ that ŵakes theŵ ͞safeƌ͟ to ouƌ peƌsoŶal psǇĐhologǇ, it is a foƌŵ of 
͞iŶteƌpƌetatiǀe deŶial͟. If ǁe ƌeĐogŶise the tƌouďliŶg iŵpliĐatioŶs of these facts but respond 
by busying ourselves on activities that do not arise from a full assessment of the situation, 
theŶ that is ͞iŵpliĐatiǀe deŶial͟. Fosteƌ aƌgues that iŵpliĐatiǀe deŶial is ƌife ǁithiŶ the 
environmental movement, from dipping into a local Transition Towns initiative, signing online 
petitioŶs, oƌ ƌeŶouŶĐiŶg flǇiŶg, theƌe aƌe eŶdless ǁaǇs foƌ people to ďe ͞doiŶg soŵethiŶg͟ 
without seriously confronting the reality of climate change. 
 
There are three main factors that could be encouraging professional environmentalists in their 
denial that our societies will collapse in the near-term. The first is the way the natural 
scientific community operates. Eminent climate scientist James Hansen has always been 
ahead of the conservative consensus in his analyses and predictions. Using the case study of 
sea leǀel ƌise, he thƌeǁ light oŶ pƌoĐesses that lead to ͞sĐieŶtifiĐ ƌetiĐeŶĐe͟ to ĐoŶĐlude aŶd 
communicate scenarios that would be disturbing to employers, funders, governments and the 
public (Hansen, 2007). A more detailed study of this process across issues and institutions 
found that climate-ĐhaŶge sĐieŶtists ƌoutiŶelǇ uŶdeƌestiŵate iŵpaĐts ͞ďǇ eƌƌiŶg oŶ the side of 
least drama" (Brysse et al, 2013). Combined with the norms of scientific analysis and reporting 
to be cautious and avoid bombast, and the time it takes to fund, research, produce and 
publish peer reviewed scientific studies, this means that the information available to 
environmental professionals about the state of the climate is not as frightening as it could be. 
In this paper I have had to mix information from peer-reviewed articles with recent data from 
individual scientists and their research institutions to provide the evidence which suggests we 
are now in a non-linear situation of climactic changes and effects. 
 
A second set of factors influencing denial may be personal. George Marshall summarised the 
insights from psychology on climate denial, including the interpretive and implicative denial of 
those of who are aware but have not prioritised it. In particular, we are social beings and our 
assessment of what to do about information is influenced by our culture. Therefore, people 
often avoid voicing certain thoughts when they go against the social norm around them 
and/or their social identity. Especially in situations of shared powerlessness, it can be 
perceived as safer to hide one's views and do nothing if it goes against the status quo. 
Marshall also explains how our typical fear of death means that we do not give our full 
attention to information that reminds us of that. According to anthropologist Ernest Becker 
;ϭϵϳϯͿ: ͞A feaƌ of death lies at the ĐeŶtƌe of all huŵaŶ ďelief.͟ Maƌshall eǆplaiŶs: ͞The deŶial 
of death is a ͚ǀital lie͛ that leads us to iŶǀest ouƌ effoƌts iŶto ouƌ Đultuƌes and social groups to 
obtain a sense of permanence and survival beyond our death. Thus, [Becker] argued, when we 
receive reminders of our death – what he calls death salience – we respond by defending 
those ǀalues aŶd Đultuƌes.͟ This ǀieǁ ǁas ƌeĐeŶtlǇ eǆpouŶded as paƌt of the ͞teƌƌoƌ 
ŵaŶageŵeŶt theoƌǇ͟ pƌoposed ďǇ Jeff GƌeeŶďeƌg, “heldoŶ “oloŵoŶ, aŶd Toŵ PǇszĐzǇŶski 
(2015). Although Marshall does not consider it directly, these processes would apply more so 
to ͞Đollapse deŶial͟ thaŶ to Đliŵate deŶial, as the death involves not only oneself but all of 
what one could contribute to.  
 
These personal processes are likely made worse for sustainability experts than the general 
public, given the typical allegiance of professionals to incumbent social structures. Research 
has revealed that people who have a higher level of formal education are more supportive of 
the existing social and economic systems that those that have less education (Schmidt, 2000). 
The argument is that people who have invested time and money in progressing to a higher 
status within existing social structures are more naturally inclined to imagine reform of those 
systems than their upending. This situation is accentuated if we assume our livelihood, 
identity and self-worth is dependent on the perspective that progress on sustainability is 
possible and that we are part of that progressive process.  
 
The third factor influencing denial is institutional. I have worked for over 20 years within or 
with organisations working on the sustainability agenda, in non-profit, private and 
governmental sectors. In none of these sectors is there an obvious institutional self-interest in 
articulating the probability or inevitability of social collapse. Not to members of your charity, 
not to consumers of your product, not to voters for your party. There are a few niche 
companies that benefit from a collapse discourse leading some people to seek to prepare by 
buying their products. This field may expand in future, at various scales of preparedness, 
which I return to below. But the internal culture of environmental groups remains strongly in 
favour of appearing effective, even when decades of investment and campaigning have not 
produced a net positive outcome on climate, ecosystems or many specific species.  
 
Let us look at the largest environmental charity, WWF, as an example of this process of 
organisational drivers of implicative denial. I worked for them when we were striving towards 
all UK ǁood pƌoduĐt iŵpoƌts ďeiŶg fƌoŵ sustaiŶaďle foƌests ďǇ ϭϵϵϱ. TheŶ it ďeĐaŵe ͞ǁell-
ŵaŶaged͟ foƌests ďǇ ϮϬϬϬ. TheŶ taƌgets ǁeƌe ƋuietlǇ foƌgotteŶ ǁhile the poteŶsiphoŶiĐ 
language of solving deforestation through innovative partnerships remained. If the employees 
of the ǁoƌld͛s leadiŶg eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal gƌoups ǁeƌe oŶ peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe ƌelated paǇ, theǇ ǁould 
probably owe their members and donors money by now. The fact that some readers may find 
such a comment to be rude and unhelpful, highlights how our interests in civility, praise and 
belonging within a professional community can censor those of us who seek to communicate 
uncomfortable truths in memorable ways (like that journalist in the New York Magazine).  
 
These personal and institutional factors mean that environmental professionals may be some 
of the slowest to process the implications of the latest climate information. In 2017, a survey 
of more than 8,000 people across 8 different countries – Australia, Brazil, China, Germany, 
India, South Africa, the UK, and the US – asked respondents to gauge their perceived level of 
security as compared to two years ago in regards to global risks. A total of 61% said they felt 
more insecure, while only 18% said they felt more secure. On climate change, 48% of 
respondents strongly agreed that it is a global catastrophic risk, with an additional 36% of 
people tending to agree with that. Only 14% of respondents disagreed to some degree with 
the idea that climate change presented a catastrophic risk (Hill, 2017). This perspective on 
climate may help explain other survey data that suggests remarkable changes in how people 
view technology, progress, their society, and the future prospects for their children. A 2017 
global survey found that only 13% of the public think the world is getting better, which is 
major change from the ten years before (Ipsos MORI, 2017). In the USA, polls indicate that 
belief in technology as a good force has been fading (Asay, 2013). This information may reflect 
a wider questioning of the idea that progress is always good and possible. Such as shift in 
perspective is indicated by opinion polls showing that far fewer people today than the last 
decade believe their children will have a better future than themselves (Stokes, 2017). 
Another indicator of whether people believe in their future is if they believe in the basis of 
their society. Studies have consistently found that more people are losing faith in electoral 
democracy and in the economic system (Bendell and Lopatin, 2017). The questioning of 
mainstream life and of progress is also reflected in the shift away from secular-rational values 
to traditional values that has been occurring worldwide since 2010 (World Values Survey, 
2016). How do children feel about their futures? I have not found a large or longitudinal study 
oŶ ĐhildƌeŶ͛s ǀieǁs of the futuƌe, ďut oŶe jouƌŶalist ǁho asked ĐhildƌeŶ fƌoŵ ϲ to ϭϮ Ǉeaƌs old 
to paint what they expect the world in 50 years to be like generated mostly apocalyptic 
iŵages ;BaŶos ‘uiz, ϮϬϭϳͿ. This eǀideŶĐe suggests that the idea ǁe ͞eǆpeƌts͟ Ŷeed to ďe 
Đaƌeful aďout ǁhat to tell ͞theŵ͟ the ͞uŶsuppoƌted puďliĐ͟ ŵaǇ ďe a ŶaƌĐissistiĐ delusioŶ iŶ 
need of immediate remedy.  
 
Emotional difficulties with realising the tragedy that is coming, and in many ways that is upon 
us already, are understandable. Yet these difficulties need to be overcome so we can explore 
what the implications may be for our work, lives and communities.  
 
Framing After Denial 
 
As a sense of calamity grows within the environmental movement, some argue against a focus 
on "carbon reductionism" for how it may limit our appreciation of why we face this tragedy 
and what to do about it (Eisenstein, 2018). I agree that climate change is not just a pollution 
problem, but an indicator of how our human psyche and culture became divorced from our 
natural habitat. However, that does not mean we should deprioritise the climate situation for 
a broader environmental agenda. 
 
If we allow ourselves to accept that a climate-induced form of economic and social collapse is 
now likely, then we can begin to explore the nature and likelihood of that collapse. That is 
when we discover a range of different views. Some frame the future as involving a collapse of 
this economic and social system, which does not necessarily mean a complete collapse of law, 
order, identity and values. Some regard that kind of collapse as offering a potential upside in 
bringing humanity to a post-consumerist way of life that would be more conscious of 
relationships between people and nature (Eisenstein, 2013). Some even argue that this 
reconnection with nature will generate hitherto unimaginable solutions to our predicament. 
Sometimes that view comes with a belief in the power of spiritual practices to influence the 
material world according to human intent. The perspective that natural or spiritual 
reconnection might save us from catastrophe is, however, a psychological response one could 
analyse as a form of denial.  
 
Some analysts emphasise the unpredictable and catastrophic nature of this collapse, so that it 
will not be possible to plan a way to transition at either collective or small-scale levels to a 
new way of life that we might imagine as tolerable, let alone beautiful. Then others go further 
still and argue that the data can be interpreted as indicating climate change is now in a 
runaway pattern, with inevitable methane release from the seafloor leading to a rapid 
Đollapse of soĐieties that ǁill tƌiggeƌ ŵultiple ŵeltdoǁŶs of soŵe of the ǁoƌld͛s ϰϬϬ nuclear 
power-stations, leading to the extinction of the human race (Macpherson, 2016). This 
assessment that we face near-term human extinction can draw on the conclusions by 
geologists that the last mass extinction of life on earth, where 95% of species disappeared, 
was due to methane-induced rapid warming of the atmosphere (Lee, 2014; Brand et al, 2016).  
 
With each of these framings – collapse, catastrophe, extinction – people describe different 
degrees of certainty. Different people speak of a scenario being possible, probable or 
inevitable. In my conversations with both professionals in sustainability or climate, and others 
not directly involved, I have found that people choose a scenario and a probability depending 
not on what the data and its analysis might suggest, but what they are choosing to live with as 
a story about this topic. That parallels findings in psychology that none of us are purely logic 
machines but relate information into stories about how things relate and why (Marshall, 
2014). None of us are immune to that process. Currently, I have chosen to interpret the 
information as indicating inevitable collapse, probable catastrophe and possible extinction. 
There is a growing community of people who conclude we face inevitable human extinction 
and treat that view as a prerequisite for meaningful discussions about the implications for our 
lives right now. For instance, there are thousands of people on Facebook groups who believe 
human extinction is near. In such groups I have witnessed how people who doubt extinction is 
either inevitable or coming soon are disparaged by some participants for being weak and 
deluded. This could reflect how some of us may find it easier to believe in a certain than 
uncertain story, especially when the uncertain future would be so different to today that it is 
difficult to comprehend. Reflection on the end of times, or eschatology, is a major dimension 
of the human experience, and the total sense of loss of everything one could ever contribute 
to is an extremely powerful experience for many people. How they emerge from that 
experience depends on many factors, with loving kindness, creativity, transcendence, anger, 
depression, nihilism and apathy all being potential responses. Given the potential spiritual 
experience triggered by sensing the imminent extinction of the human race, we can 
appreciate why a belief in the inevitability of extinction could be a basis for some people to 
come together.  
 
In my work with mature students, I have found that inviting them to consider collapse as 
inevitable, catastrophe as probable and extinction as possible, has not led to apathy or 
depression. Instead, in a supportive environment, where we have enjoyed community with 
each other, celebrating ancestors and enjoying nature before then looking at this information 
and possible framings for it, something positive happens. I have witnessed a shedding of 
concern for conforming to the status quo, and a new creativity about what to focus on going 
forward. Despite that, a certain discombobulation occurs and remains over time as one tries 
to find a way forward in a society where such perspectives are uncommon. Continued sharing 
about the implications as we transition our work and lives is valuable.  
 
One further factor in the framing of our situation concerns timing. Which also concerns 
geography. Where and when will the collapse or catastrophe begin? When will it affect my 
livelihood and society? Has it already begun? Although it is difficult to forecast and impossible 
to predict with certainty, that does not mean we should not try. The current data on 
temperature rise at the poles and impacts on weather patterns around the world suggests we 
are already in the midst of dramatic changes that will impact massively and negatively on 
agriculture within the next twenty years. Impacts have already begun. That sense of near-term 
disruption to our ability to feed ourselves and our families, and the implications for crime and 
conflict, adds another level to the discombobulation I mentioned. Should you drop everything 
now and move somewhere more suitable for self-sufficiency? Should you be spending time 
reading the rest of this article? Should I even finish writing it? Some of the people who believe 
that we face inevitable extinction believe that no one will read this article because we will see 
a collapse of civilisation in the next twelve months when the harvests fail across the northern 
hemisphere. They see social collapse leading to immediate meltdowns of nuclear power 
stations and thus human extinction being a near-term phenomenon. Certainly not more than 
five years from now. The clarity and drama of their message is why Inevitable Near Term 
Human Extinction (INTHE) has become a widely used phrase online for discussions about 
climate-collapse.   
 
Writing about that perspective makes me sad. Even four years after I first let myself consider 
near-term extinction properly, not as something to dismiss, it still makes my jaw drop, eyes 
moisten, and air escape my lungs. I have seen how the idea of INTHE can lead me to focus on 
truth, love and joy in the now, which is wonderful, but how it can also make me lose interest 
in planning for the future. And yet I always come around to the same conclusion – we do not 
know. Ignoring the future because it is unlikely to matteƌ ŵight ďaĐkfiƌe. ͞‘uŶŶiŶg foƌ the 
hills͟ – to create our own eco-community – might backfire. But we definitely know that 
continuing to work in the ways we have done until now is not just backfiring – it is holding the 
gun to our own heads. With this in mind, we can choose to explore how to evolve what we do, 
without any simple answers. In my post-denial state, shared by increasing numbers of my 
students and colleagues, I realised that we would benefit from conceptual maps for how to 
address these questions. I therefore set about synthesising the main things people talked 
about doing differently in light of a view of inevitable collapse and probable catastrophe. That 
is ǁhat I offeƌ Ŷoǁ as the ͞deep adaptatioŶ ageŶda.͟ 
 
The Deep Adaptation Agenda 
 
For many years, discussions and initiatives on adaptation to climate change were seen by 
environmental activists and policymakers as unhelpful to the necessary focus on carbon 
emissions reductions. That view finally changed in 2010 when the IPCC gave more attention to 
how societies and economies could be helped to adapt to climate change, and the United 
Nations Global Adaptation Network was founded to promote knowledge sharing and 
ĐollaďoƌatioŶ. Fiǀe Ǉeaƌs lateƌ the Paƌis AĐĐoƌd ďetǁeeŶ ŵeŵďeƌ states pƌoduĐed a ͞Global 
Goal oŶ AdaptatioŶ͟ ;GGAͿ ǁith the aiŵ of ͞eŶhaŶĐiŶg adaptiǀe ĐapaĐitǇ, stƌeŶgtheŶiŶg 
resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change, with a view to contributing to 
sustainable development and ensuring an adequate adaptation response in the context of the 
gloďal teŵpeƌatuƌe goal͟ ;Đited iŶ “iŶgh, HaƌŵeliŶg aŶd ‘ai, ϮϬϭϲͿ. CouŶtƌies Đoŵŵitted to 
develop National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and report on their creation to the UN.  
 
Since then the funding being made available to climate adaptation has grown, with all the 
international development institutions active on adaptation finance. In 2018 the International 
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) and the 
World Bank each agreed major financing for governments to increase resilience of their 
communities. Some of their projects include the Green Climate Fund, which was created to 
provide lower income countries with assistance. Typical projects include improving the ability 
of small-scale farmers to cope with weather variability through the introduction of irrigation 
and the ability of urban planners to respond to rising sea levels and extreme rainfall events 
through reengineering drainage systems (Climate Action Programme, 2018). These initiatives 
are falling short of the commitments made by governments over the past 8 years, and so 
more is being done to promote private bonds to finance adaptation (Bernhardt, 2018) as well 
as stimulate private philanthropy on this agenda (Williams, 2018). 
 
These effoƌts aƌe paƌalleled ďǇ aŶ iŶĐƌeased ƌaŶge of aĐtiǀities uŶdeƌ the uŵďƌella of ͞Disasteƌ 
‘isk ‘eduĐtioŶ͟ ǁhiĐh has its oǁŶ iŶteƌŶatioŶal ageŶĐǇ – the United Nations International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR). The aim of their work is to reduce the damage 
caused by natural hazards like earthquakes, floods, droughts and cyclones, through reducing 
sensitivity to these hazards as well as the capacity to respond when disasters hit. That focus 
means significant engagement with urban planners and local governments. In the business 
sector, this disaster risk reduction agenda meets the private sector through the well-
established fields of risk management and business continuity management. Companies ask 
themselves what the points of failure might be in their value chains and seek to reduce those 
vulnerabilities or the significance of something failing.  
 
Given the climate science we discussed earlier, some people may think this action is too little 
too late. Yet, if such action reduces some harm temporarily, that will help people, just like you 
and me, and therefore such action should not be disregarded. Nevertheless, we can look more 
critically at how people and organisations are framing the situation and the limitations that 
suĐh a fƌaŵiŶg ŵaǇ iŵpose. The iŶitiatiǀes aƌe tǇpiĐallǇ desĐƌiďed as pƌoŵotiŶg ͞ƌesilieŶĐe͟, 
rather than sustainability. Some definitions of resilience within the environmental sector are 
surprisingly upbeat. For instance, the Stockholm Resilience Centre (2015) explains that 
͞ƌesilieŶĐe is the ĐapaĐitǇ of a sǇsteŵ, ďe it aŶ iŶdiǀidual, a foƌest, a ĐitǇ oƌ aŶ eĐoŶoŵǇ, to 
deal with change and continue to develop. It is about how humans and nature can use shocks 
and disturbances like a financial crisis or climate change to spur renewal and innovative 
thiŶkiŶg.͟ IŶ offeƌiŶg that defiŶitioŶ, theǇ aƌe dƌaǁiŶg oŶ ĐoŶĐepts iŶ ďiologǇ, ǁheƌe 
ecosystems are observed to overcome disturbances and increase their complexity (Brand and 
Jax, 2007).  
 
Tǁo issues ƌeƋuiƌe atteŶtioŶ at this poiŶt. Fiƌst, the upďeat allegiaŶĐe to ͞deǀelopŵeŶt͟ aŶd 
͞pƌogƌess͟ iŶ ĐeƌtaiŶ disĐouƌses aďout ƌesilieŶĐe ŵaǇ Ŷot ďe helpful as we enter a period 
ǁheŶ ŵateƌial ͞pƌogƌess͟ ŵaǇ Ŷot ďe possiďle aŶd so aiŵiŶg foƌ it ŵight ďeĐoŵe ĐouŶteƌ-
productive. Second, apart from some limited soft skills development, the initiatives under the 
resilience banner are nearly all focused on physical adaptation to climate change, rather than 
ĐoŶsideƌiŶg a ǁideƌ peƌspeĐtiǀe oŶ psǇĐhologiĐal ƌesilieŶĐe. IŶ psǇĐhologǇ, ͞ƌesilieŶĐe is the 
process of adapting well in the face of adversity, trauma, tragedy, threats or significant 
sources of stress — such as family and relationship problems, serious health problems or 
ǁoƌkplaĐe aŶd fiŶaŶĐial stƌessoƌs. It ŵeaŶs ͚ďouŶĐiŶg ďaĐk͛ fƌoŵ diffiĐult eǆpeƌieŶĐes͟ 
;AŵeƌiĐaŶ PsǇĐhologǇ AssoĐiatioŶ, ϮϬϭϴͿ. Hoǁ a peƌsoŶ ͞ďouŶĐes ďaĐk͟ afteƌ diffiĐulties oƌ 
loss, may be through a creative reinterpretation of identity and priorities. The concept of 
resilience in psychology does not, therefore, assume that people return to how they were 
before. Given the climate reality we now face, this less progressivist framing of resilience is 
more useful for a deeper adaptation agenda.  
 
IŶ puƌsuit of a ĐoŶĐeptual ŵap of ͞deep adaptatioŶ,͟ ǁe ĐaŶ ĐoŶĐeiǀe of ƌesilieŶĐe of huŵaŶ 
societies as the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances so as to survive with valued 
norms and behaviours. Given that analysts are concluding that a social collapse is inevitable, 
the question becomes: What are the valued norms and behaviours that human societies will 
wish to maintain as they seek to survive? That highlights how deep adaptation will involve 
ŵoƌe thaŶ ͞ƌesilieŶĐe.͟ It ďƌiŶgs us to a seĐoŶd aƌea of this ageŶda, ǁhiĐh I haǀe Ŷaŵed 
͞ƌeliŶƋuishŵeŶt.͟ It iŶǀolǀes people aŶd ĐoŵŵuŶities lettiŶg go of ĐeƌtaiŶ assets, ďehaǀiouƌs 
and beliefs where retaining them could make matters worse. Examples include withdrawing 
from coastlines, shutting down vulnerable industrial facilities, or giving up expectations for 
ĐeƌtaiŶ tǇpes of ĐoŶsuŵptioŶ. The thiƌd aƌea ĐaŶ ďe Đalled ͞ƌestoƌatioŶ.͟ It iŶǀolǀes people 
and communities rediscovering attitudes and approaches to life and organisation that our 
hydrocarbon-fuelled civilisation eroded. Examples include re-wilding landscapes, so they 
provide more ecological benefits and require less management, changing diets back to match 
the seasons, rediscovering non-electronically powered forms of play, and increased 
community-level productivity and support.  
 
It is not my intention in this paper to map out more specific implications of a deep adaptation 
agenda. Indeed, it is impossible to do so, and to attempt it would assume we are in a situation 
for calculated attempts at management, when what we face is a complex predicament beyond 
our control. Rather, I hope the deep adaptation agenda of resilience, relinquishment and 
restoration can be a useful framework for community dialogue in the face of climate change. 
‘esilieŶĐe asks us ͞hoǁ do ǁe keep ǁhat ǁe ƌeallǇ ǁaŶt to keep?͟ ‘eliŶƋuishŵeŶt asks us 
͞ǁhat do ǁe Ŷeed to let go of iŶ oƌdeƌ to Ŷot ŵake ŵatteƌs ǁoƌse?͟ ‘estoƌatioŶ asks us ͞ǁhat 
ĐaŶ ǁe ďƌiŶg ďaĐk to help us ǁith the ĐoŵiŶg diffiĐulties aŶd tƌagedies?͟ In 2017, this deep 
adaptation agenda was used to frame a festival of alternatives organised by Peterborough 
Environment City Trust. It included a whole day devoted to exploring what relinquishment 
could involve. As such, it allowed more open conversation and imagination than a narrower 
focus on resilience. Further events are planned across the UK. Whether it will be useful 
framing for a broader-level policy agenda is yet to be seen.  
 
How does this "deep adaptation agenda" relate to the broad conceptual framework of 
sustainable development? It is related to other perspectives that despite the attention of 
inteƌŶatioŶal iŶstitutioŶs to ͞sustaiŶaďle deǀelopŵeŶt goals,͟ the eƌa of ͞sustaiŶaďle 
deǀelopŵeŶt͟ as uŶifǇiŶg ĐoŶĐept aŶd goal is Ŷoǁ eŶdiŶg. It is aŶ eǆpliĐitlǇ post-sustainability 
framing, and part of the Restoration Approach to engaging with social and environmental 
dilemmas, as I outlined elsewhere (Bendell, et al 2017).  
 
Research Futures in the Face of Climate Tragedy 
 
I was only partly joking earlier when I questioned why I was even writing this paper. If all the 
data and analysis turn out to be misleading, and this society continues nicely for the coming 
decades, then this article will not have helped my career. If the predicted collapse comes 
ǁithiŶ the Ŷeǆt deĐade, theŶ I ǁoŶ͛t haǀe a Đaƌeeƌ. It is the peƌfeĐt lose-lose. I mention this to 
highlight how it will not be easy to identify ways forward as academic researchers and 
educators in the field of organisational sustainability. For the academics reading this paper, 
most of you will have increasing teaching loads, in areas where you are expected to cover 
certain content. I know you may have little time and space for reinventing your expertise and 
focus. Those of you who have a mandate to research might discover that the deep adaptation 
agenda is not an easy topic for finding research partners and funders. This restrictive situation 
was not always the reality faced by academics. It is the result of changes in higher education, 
that are one expression of an ideology that has made the human race so poor at addressing a 
threat to its wellbeing and even existence. It is an ideology that many of us have been 
complicit in promoting, if we have been working in business schools. It is important to 
recognise that complicity, before considering how to evolve our research in the face of the 
climate tragedy.  
 
The West͛s ƌespoŶse to eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal issues has ďeeŶ ƌestƌiĐted ďǇ the doŵiŶaŶĐe of 
neoliberal economics since the 1970s. That led to hyper-individualist, market fundamentalist, 
incremental and atomistic approaches. By hyper-individualist, I mean a focus on individual 
action as consumers, switching light bulbs or buying sustainable furniture, rather than 
promoting political action as engaged citizens. By market fundamentalist, I mean a focus on 
market mechanisms like the complex, costly and largely useless carbon cap and trade systems, 
rather than exploring what more government intervention could achieve. By incremental, I 
mean a focus on celebrating small steps forward such as a company publishing a sustainability 
report, rather than strategies designed for a speed and scale of change suggested by the 
science. By atomistic, I mean a focus on seeing climate action as a separate issue from the 
governance of markets, finance and banking, rather than exploring what kind of economic 
system could permit or enable sustainability. 
 
This ideology has now influenced the workloads and priorities of academics in most 
universities, which restricts how we can respond to the climate tragedy. In my own case, I 
took an unpaid sabbatical, and writing this paper is one of the outcomes of that decision. We 
no longer have time for the career games of aiming to publish in top-ranked journals to 
impress our line managers or improve our CV for if we enter the job market. Nor do we have a 
need for the narrow specialisms that are required to publish in such journals. So, yes, I am 
suggesting that in order to let oneself evolve in response to the climate tragedy one may have 
to quit a job – and even a career. However, if one is prepared to do that, then one can engage 
with an employer and professional community from a new place of confidence.  
 
If staying in academia, I recommend you begin to ask some questions of all that you research 
aŶd teaĐh. WheŶ ƌeadiŶg otheƌs͛ ƌeseaƌĐh, I ƌeĐoŵŵeŶd askiŶg: ͞Hoǁ ŵight these fiŶdiŶgs 
inform efforts for a more massive and urgent pursuit of resilience, relinquishment and 
ƌestoƌatioŶ iŶ the faĐe of soĐial Đollapse?͟ You ŵaǇ fiŶd that ŵost of ǁhat Ǉou ƌead offeƌs 
little oŶ that ƋuestioŶ, aŶd, theƌefoƌe, Ǉou Ŷo loŶgeƌ ǁish to eŶgage ǁith it. OŶ oŶe͛s oǁŶ 
researĐh, I ƌeĐoŵŵeŶd askiŶg: ͞If I didŶ͛t ďelieǀe iŶ iŶĐƌeŵeŶtal iŶĐoƌpoƌatioŶ of Đliŵate 
ĐoŶĐeƌŶs iŶto ĐuƌƌeŶt oƌgaŶisatioŶs aŶd sǇsteŵs, ǁhat ŵight I ǁaŶt to kŶoǁ ŵoƌe aďout?͟ IŶ 
answering that question, I recommend talking to non-specialists as much as people in your 
own field, so that you are able to talk more freely and consider all options.  
 
In my own work, I stopped researching corporate sustainability. I learned about leadership 
and communications and began to research, teach and advise on these matters, in the 
political arena. I began to work on systems to enable re-localisation of economies and support 
for community development, particular those systems using local currencies. I sought to share 
that knowledge more widely, and therefore launched a free online course (The Money and 
Society Mass Open Online Course). I began to spend more time reading and talking about the 
climate tragedy and what I might do, or stop doing, with that in mind. This rethinking and 
repositioning is ongoing, but I can no longer work on subjects that do not have some 
relevance to deep adaptation. Looking ahead, I see the need and opportunity for more work 
at multiple levels. People will need more support to access information and networks for how 
to attempt a shift in their livelihoods and lifestyles. Existing approaches to living off-grid in 
intentional communities are useful to learn from, but this agenda needs to go further in asking 
questions like how small-scale production of drugs like aspirin is possible. Free online and in-
person courses as well as support networks on self-sufficiency need to be scaled. Local 
governments will need similar support on how to develop the capabilities today that will help 
their local communities to collaborate, not fracture, during a collapse. For instance, they will 
need to roll out systems for productive cooperation between neighbours, such as product and 
service exchange platforms enabled by locally issued currency. At the international level, there 
is the need to work on how to responsibly address the wider fallout from collapsing societies 
(Harrington, 2016). These will be many, but obviously include the challenges of refugee 
support and the securing of dangerous industrial and nuclear sites at the moment of a societal 
collapse.  
 
Other intellectual disciplines and traditions may be of interest support going forward. Human 
extinction and the topic of eschatology, or the end of the world, is something that has been 
discussed in various academic disciplines, as you might expect. In theology it has been widely 
discussed, while it also appears in literary theory as an interesting element to creative writing 
and in psychology during the 1980s as a phenomenon related to the threat of nuclear war. The 
field of psychology seems to be particularly relevant going forward.  
 
Whatever we choose to work on in future will not be a simple calculation. It will be shaped by 
the emotional or psychological implications of this new awareness of a societal collapse being 
likely in our own lifetimes. I have explored some of these emotional issues and how they have 
been affecting my work choices, in a reflective essay on the spiritual implications of climate 
despair (Bendell, 2018). I recommend giving yourself time for such reflection and evolution, 
rather than rushing in to a new agenda of research or teaching. If you are a student, then I 
recommend sending your lecturers this paper and inviting a class discussion about these ideas. 
It is likely that those who are not embedded within the existing system will be the ones more 
able to lead this agenda.  
I think it may be our vanity as academics to think that any one but academics and students 
read academic papers. Therefore, I have chosen to leave my recommendations for managers, 
policy makers and lay persons for another outlet.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Since records began in 1850, seventeen of the eighteen hottest years have occurred since  
2000. Important steps on climate mitigation and adaptation have been taken over the past 
decade. However, these steps could now be regarded as equivalent to walking up a landslide. 
If the landslide had not already begun, then quicker and bigger steps would get us to the top 
of where we want to be. Sadly, the latest climate data, emissions data and data on the spread 
of carbon-intensive lifestyles, show that the landslide has already begun. As the point of no 
ƌetuƌŶ ĐaŶ͛t ďe fullǇ kŶoǁŶ uŶtil afteƌ the eǀeŶt, aŵďitious ǁoƌk oŶ ƌeduĐiŶg ĐaƌďoŶ 
emissions and extracting more from the air (naturally and synthetically) is more critical than 
ever. That must involve a new front of action on methane.  
 
Disruptive impacts from climate change are now inevitable. Geoengineering is likely to be 
ineffective or counter-productive. Therefore, the mainstream climate policy community now 
recognises the need to work much more on adaptation to the effects of climate change. That 
must now rapidly permeate the broader field of people engaged in sustainable development 
as practitioners, researchers and educators. In assessing how our approaches could evolve, we 
need to appreciate what kind of adaptation is possible. Recent research suggests that human 
societies will experience disruptions to their basic functioning within less than ten years due to 
climate stress. Such disruptions include increased levels of malnutrition, starvation, disease, 
civil conflict and war – and will not avoid affluent nations. This situation makes redundant the 
reformist approach to sustainable development and related fields of corporate sustainability 
that has underpinned the approach of many professionals (Bendell et al, 2017). Instead, a new 
approach which explores how to reduce harm and not make matters worse is important to 
develop. In support of that challenging, and ultimately personal process, understanding a deep 
adaptation agenda may be useful. 
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Letter to the Editor of SAMPJ, Professor Carol Adams, from Professor Jem Bendell, 27th July 2018.  
Dear Professor Adams, 
It is an odd situation to be in as a writer, but I feel compassion for anyone reading my Deep Adaptation 
article on the inevitability of near term social collapse due to climate chaos! I am especially grateful for 
anyone taking the time to analyse it in depth and provide feedback. So, I am grateful to you arranging 
that and the reviewers for providing their feedback. Some of the feedback, particularly 
recommendations for a better introduction, were helpful. However, I am unable to work with their main 
requests for revisions, as they are, I believe, either impossible or inappropriate, as I will seek to explain.  
I agree with Professor Rob GƌaǇ that ͞The jouƌŶal's ĐoŶstaŶt eǆploƌatioŶ of Ŷeǁ aŶd ĐhalleŶgiŶg 
perspectives on how accountability and sustainability might play out in organisations ensures a 
stiŵulatiŶg souƌĐe of aƌtiĐles, eǆpeƌieŶĐes aŶd ideas.͟ It is ǁhǇ I ǁas pleased to guest edit an issue last 
year and bring critical perspectives on leadership to its readership. However, the topic of inevitable 
Đollapse fƌoŵ Đliŵate ĐhaŶge is so ĐhalleŶgiŶg it is Ŷot suƌpƌisiŶg it didŶ’t fiŶd suppoƌt fƌoŵ the 
anonymous peer reviewers.  
I would have had difficulty finding motivation for undertaking a complete re-write given the conclusion 
of the paper – that the pƌeŵise of the ͞sustaiŶaďle ďusiŶess͟ field that the jouƌŶal is paƌt of is Ŷo loŶgeƌ 
valid. Indeed, the assumptions about progress and stability that lead us to stay in academia in the field 
of management studies are also now under question.  
The fiƌst ƌefeƌee ƋuestioŶed ͞to ǁhiĐh liteƌatuƌe ;sͿ does this aƌtiĐle aĐtuallǇ ĐoŶtƌiďute͟ aŶd stated that 
͞the ƌeseaƌĐh ƋuestioŶ oƌ gap that Ǉou iŶteŶd to addƌess ŵust ďe dƌaǁŶ fƌoŵ the liteƌatuƌe,͟ 
ĐoŶtiŶuiŶg that ͞to joiŶ the ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶ, Ǉou Ŷeed to ďe aǁaƌe of the ĐuƌƌeŶt ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶ iŶ the field, 
ǁhiĐh ĐaŶ ďe ideŶtified ďǇ ƌeǀieǁiŶg ƌeleǀaŶt aŶd ƌeĐeŶt aƌtiĐles puďlished iŶ these jouƌŶals.͟ That is 
the standard guidance I use with my students and it was both amusing and annoying to read that 
feedback after having dozens of peer reviewed articles published over the last 20 years. The problem 
with that guidance is when the article is challenging the basis of the field and where there are not any 
other articles exploring or accepting the same premise. For instance, there are no articles in either 
SAMPJ or Organisation and Environment that explore implications for business practice or policy of a 
near term inevitable collapse due to environmental catastrophe (including those that mention or 
addƌess Đliŵate adaptatioŶͿ. That isŶ’t suƌpƌisiŶg, ďeĐause the data hasŶ’t ďeeŶ so ĐoŶĐlusiǀe oŶ that 
until the last couple of years.  
It is suƌpƌisiŶg theƌefoƌe that the fiƌst ƌeǀieǁeƌ saǇs ͞the papeƌ does Ŷot ĐoŶtaiŶ aŶǇ Ŷeǁ oƌ sigŶifiĐaŶt 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ. The papeƌ ƌeiteƌates ǁhat has alƌeadǇ ďeeŶ told ďǇ ŵaŶǇ studies.͟ The ƌeǀieǁeƌ iŵplies 
therefore that the paper is about climate change ďeiŶg a ďig pƌoďleŵ. But the aƌtiĐle doesŶ’t saǇ that. 
It saǇs that ǁe faĐe aŶ uŶsolǀaďle pƌediĐaŵeŶt aŶd gƌeat tƌagedǇ. WheŶ the ƌeǀieǁeƌ saǇs ͞Theƌe aƌe 
Ŷot Đleaƌ ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶs that ĐaŶ ďe deƌiǀed fƌoŵ the aƌtiĐle͟ theŶ I ǁoŶdeƌ ǁhetheƌ that is ǁilful 
blindness, as the article is saying that the basis of the field is now untenable.  
At a couple of points, I attempted to cut through the unemotional way that research is presented. Or 
instance, when I directly address the reader about the implications of the analysis for their own likely 
hunger and safety, it is to elicit an emotional response. I say in the text why I express myself in that and 
that although it is not typical in some journals the situation we face suggests to me that we do try to 
communicate eŵotiǀelǇ. The ƌeǀieǁeƌ ĐoŵŵeŶts ͞the laŶguage used is Ŷot appƌopƌiate foƌ a sĐholaƌlǇ 
aƌtiĐle.͟ 
The seĐoŶd ƌeǀieǁeƌ suŵŵaƌises the papeƌ as ͞the iŶtƌoduĐtioŶ of deep adaptatioŶ as aŶ effeĐtiǀe 
ƌespoŶse to Đliŵate ĐhaŶge͟ ǁhiĐh suggests to ŵe a fuŶdaŵeŶtal misunderstanding despite it being 
ŵade Đleaƌ thƌoughout the papeƌ. Theƌe is Ŷo ͞effeĐtiǀe͟ ƌespoŶse. The ƌeǀieǁeƌ also ǁƌites ͞I aŵ Ŷot 
sure that the extensive presentation of climate data supports the core argument of the paper in a 
ŵeaŶiŶgful ǁaǇ.͟ Yet the summary of science is the core of the paper as everything then flows from the 
conclusion of that analysis. Note that the science I summarise is about what is happening right now, 
rather than models or theories of complex adaptive systems which the reviewer would have preferred.  
One piece of feedback from the 2nd reviewer is worth quoting verbatim: 
͞The authoƌs stƌess ƌepeatedlǇ that ͞Đliŵate-iŶduĐed soĐietal Đollapse is Ŷoǁ iŶeǀitaďle͟ as if that ǁas 
a faĐtual stateŵeŶt… I ǁas left ǁoŶdeƌiŶg aďout the social implications of presenting a scenario for the 
future as inevitable reality, and about the responsibility of research in communicating climate change 
scenarios and strategies for adaptation. As the authors pointed out, denial is a common emotional 
response to situations that are perceived as threatening and inescapable, leading to a sense of 
helplessŶess, iŶadeƋuaĐǇ, aŶd hopelessŶess aŶd ultiŵatelǇ diseŶgageŵeŶt fƌoŵ the issue…͟  
This perspective is one I discuss in some detail in the paper, as one that enables denial. It reflects the 
self-defeating hierarchical attitude towards society that many of us have in both academia and 
sustainability, where we censure our own exploration of a topic due to what we consider should or 
should not be communicated. There is both scholarship and experience on the impact of 
communicating about disaster, and I discuss that in the paper. 
The trauma from assessing our situation with climate change has led me to become aware of and drop 
some of my past preoccupations and tactics. I realise it is time to fully accept my truth as I see it, even if 
partially formed and not polished yet for wider articulation. I know that academia involves as much a 
process of wrapping up truth as unfolding it. We wrap truth in disciplines, discrete methodologies, 
away from the body, away from intuition, away from the collective, away from the everyday. So as that 
is my truth then I wish to act on it as well, and not keep this analysis hidden in the pursuit of academic 
respect. Instead, I want to share it now as a tool for shifting the quality of conversations that I need to 
have. Therefore, I have decided to publish it simply as an IFLAS Occasional Paper.  
The process has helped me realise that I need to relinquish activities that I no longer have passion for, in 
what I am experiencing as a dramatically new context. Therefore, I must step back from the Editorial 
team of the journal. Thank you for having involved me and congratulations on it now being in the top 
ten journals in business, management and accounting.  
Please pass on my thanks to the reviewers. On my website www.jembendell.com I will be listing some 
links to articles, podcasts, videos and social networks that are helping people explore and come to 
terms with a realisation of near term collapse (and even extinction), which they may be interested in.   
Yours sincerely,  
Jem Bendell 
